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RULES OF COURT
FROM COMMON LAW RULES TO
RULES OF COURT
LAURANCE M. HYDEt
After almost a century of practice and procedure fixed by
statutory codes, this country is about to witness an experiment
of nation-wide scope in regulation of these matters by court
made rules. The Supreme Court of the United States has as-
sumed responsibility, upon request and authorization of Con-
gress,1 for making rules of practice and procedure in civil cases
for all federal courts. The committee, appointed by the court to
prepare these rules, presented its preliminary draft for discus-
sion at the 1936 session of the American Bar Association.2 This
great undertaking makes it worthwhile to consider how these
matters came to be so minutely regulated by legislative codes;
and what attempts have been heretofore made to regulate them
by court made rules.
Our practice and procedure, as well as our substantive law,
came to us as a part of the common law of England. It seems
to be the popular impression that common law procedure was
judge made procedure. It was, in fact, neither a set of rules
made by courts nor a code adopted by a legislative body. Instead,
it was a conglomeration of legislative enactments, rules and
orders of courts, ancient usages, and judicial decisions; the hap-
hazard growth of six centuries. Because it was a patchwork
which had been patched until it could not be made suitable for
modern conditions by more patching, it was finally superseded,
about the middle of the last century in most American jurisdic-
tions, by statutory codes fundamentally changing the whole sys-
tem. Because the legislatures in this country, which enacted
these new codes, retained the exclusive right to make any changes
therein, our codes have remained to this time substantially the
same as then enacted. In England, although agitation for law
reform had been going on since the beginning of the century,
the same fundamental changes did not come until about twenty-
t Commissioner, Supreme Court of Missouri.
1. 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. secs. 723 b and c (1934).
2. See 22 A. B. A. Journal 780 (1936).
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five years after the first procedural codes had been adopted here.
A statutory code of procedure was finally adopted there, as part
of the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 18753 but these acts gave to
the Supreme Court of Judicature the power to change this code,
and the result is that the original codes have been greatly
changed and improved.4
It is now being urged that our courts may change our pro-
cedural codes without legislative authority. Whether this is true
or not, consideration of the English governmental system makes
it immediately apparent why an act of Parliament was necessary
before English courts could have power to change statutory
rules of practice and procedure. Under our state and federal
Constitutions providing for separation of governmental func-
tions into three coordinate branches, whether the judicial depart-
ment has this power, without the consent of the legislative de-
partment, is at least a different question. Following the prece-
dent of the English Parliament, American legislatures have al-
ways exercised authority to make or change procedural rules,
and it is not the purpose of this article to discuss its constitu-
tional basis. The history of English procedure does, neverthe-
less, give us some light both upon inherent powers of courts in
this field and the advisability of having them assume this re-
sponsibility. 6
I
The governmental theory of the early Norman kings of En-
gland was very simple. "The will of the Prince was the law of
the land. '" 7 Prior to Magna Charta, all governmental powers,
executive, legislative, and judicial, could be directly exercised
by the King. He was the final court of justice and, of course,
his *power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure in his
courts was unquestioned. He appointed justices to act in his
name because it was too great a burden for him to hear all cases.
Magna Charta was partly due to dissatisfaction with the way
King John conducted his courts, and it contained several provi-
3. 36 & 37 Vict. chap. 66 (1873) ; 38 & 39 Vict. chap. 77 (1875).
4. Higgins, English Courts and Procedure (1923) 7 Amer. Judicature
Soc. Journal 185.
5. For a recent discussion see 1 U. of Mo. L. Rev. 261 (1936).
6. For a recent discussion see Tyler, Origin of the Rule Making Power(1936) 22 A. B. A. Journal 772.
7. 3 Green, History of England (1900) chap. 1.
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sions concerning that subject., Magna Charta limited the King's
powers by bringing another body into the picture; a council,
which the King agreed should be asked to give its consent to
certain measures (the principal one mentioned was taxation)
before they could become effective. This was the origin of that
historic legislative body, the Parliament of England. Magna
Charta did not grant the King's legislative power to Parliament
(as does section 1, article I, of the Constitution of the United
States) ; but the King only agreed not to exercise certain of his
legislative powers without its consent. The distinction between
governmental powers was probably not even thought of at the
time of Magna Charta. However, through intervening centuries
"the King in Parliament was established by the English common
law as the English Legislature."" That is still the theory, if not
the actual practice, of the exercise of legislative power in En-
gland.' Parliament is now perhaps more like a continuous con-
stitutional convention than it is like our legislatures. Parliament
also gained the right to require that the King obtain its consent,
or the consent of its representatives (which it came to appoint
as the King's advisors), in the exercise of his executive and
judicial powers, so that finally all government powers were, in
fact, exercised only with the advice and consent of Parliament.
One House of Parliament still is the court of last resort to set-
tle all questions of law, so naturally the courts get their authority
from this source.
Perhaps the worst of the complications of the common law
system were the numerous forms of actions. These originated
from the ancient requirement of obtaining an original writ out
of Chancery stating the nature of the plaintiff's claim, before
any suit could be commenced. Blackstone says this was deemed
8. Section 17 provided that common pleas should not follow the king but
could be held at a certain place so that people would know where to find the
court (pursuant to this provision it was established at Westminster) ; sec-
tions 18 and 19 required regular holding of Assizes in every county four
times a year and provided that the session should not end until the business
was disposed of; and section 40 contained the famous provisions which pro-
hibited selling, denying, or delaying justice to any man.
9. Dixon, The Law and the Constitution (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Rev.
590.
10. Acts of Parliament still recite: "Be it enacted by the King's Most
Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by
authority of the same."
1937]
Washington University Open Scholarship
190 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22
necessary since "it was a maxim introduced by the Normans,
that there should be no proceeding in common pleas before the
King's justices without his original writ; because they held it
unfit that those justices, being only the substitutes of the Crown,
should take cognizance of anything but what was thus expressly
referred to their judgment."'" Therefore, plaintiff's declaration
had to be based upon the statement in the original writ. West-
minster 1112 made provision for framing new writs to provide
for new situations, and the number of forms of action continued
to grow. It is said that the early judges were not interested in
preventing the increase of forms because in those days they were
paid fees according to the number of suits, and by technical con-
struction preventing joinder of similar or related claims into one
action they increased their compensation. This demonstrates the
necessity of intelligent and faithful administration to make any
system work.
In spite of the constantly increasing influence of Parliament,
the King's power to appoint judges and remove them at his
pleasure lasted until after the overthrow of James II in 1688.
During that period, we might have expected to find the courts
making all procedural rules. While many such rules were estab-
lished by court orders and decisions, it is really surprising to
find how much of common law procedure was statutory and how
early Parliament did enter this field. Chronological Tables of
Statutes, Rules and Orders, and cases, which made up common
law procedure," show that very soon after Magna Charta, Par-
liament began to provide rules of practice and procedure by stat-
ute. It was soon established that no rule or custom of proce-
dure could prevail against a specific Act of Parliament. "After
1688, no claim was made that any rules of the common law were
too fundamental to admit of change." 14 Some procedural stat-
utes were even passed during the reign of King John's successor
(his son Henry III); and during the reign of his grandson Ed-
ward I, Parliament enacted important procedural statutes, which
have remained basic rules of procedure even in America down to
our day. Westminster 11,15 among other things, provided for
11. 3 Blackstone's, Commntaies (1872) 274.
12. 13 Edw. 1 (1285).
13. See Tidd's Practice.
14. Supra, note 9, at p. 593.
15. 13 Edw. 1 (1285).
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bills of exceptions as a means to bring matters, not shown by the
record proper, before an appellate court, thus making it possible
for the first time to obtain appellate review of errors occurring
in the course of a trial. Although with modern methods of court
reporting, this ancient method is an unnecessarily cumbersome
way to make up a record bringing up the trial court's rulings for
appellate review, it is interesting to note that Missouri still uses
this method of 1279 as the only way to complete the record for
appeal. 6 Section 1008, R. S. Mo. 1929, is strikingly similar in
language to that passed more than six centuries ago when Ed-
ward I ruled England.17
The technical rules of bills of exceptions have many times re-
sulted in failure to obtain appellate consideration of important
matters on their merits. Especially was this true before 1911
when the present section 1009, R. S. 1929, was amended to per-
mit the allowance of bills of exceptions in vacation at any time
prior to the time required by appellate court rules for service of
abstracts.18 When this amendment was made the Legislature
declared an emergency to exist due to the fact "that many judg-
ments are affirmed from time to time because the bill of excep-
tions in the actions in which such judgments are rendered are
not filed within the time allowed by the trial court and are not
considered upon the merits." It would seem that this emergency
might have justified the more drastic remedy of abolishing bills
of exceptions. They had, long prior to that time, been abolished
in England by the Judicature Act, and the simpler method em-
ployed there of appeal by merely giving notice and filing in the
appellate court copies of pleadings, documents and evidence.
Order 58,19 provides: "Evidence taken in the court below (orally)
* * * shall, subject to any special order, be brought before the
Court of Appeal * * * by the production of the judge's notes, or
such other materials as the court may deem expedient." Writs
16. Spotts v. Spotts, 331 Mo. 917, 55 S. W. (2d) 977 (1932).
17. 13 Edw. 1: "If the party write the exceptions, and pray that the jus-
tices may put their seals to it for a testimony, the justices shall put their
seals etc." 2 Tidd's, Practice 852. R. S. Mo. 1929 sec. 1008: "Whenever
either party shall write his exception and pray the court to allow and sign
the same, the person composing the court shall, if such bill be true, sign the
same"; as first enacted almost the identical language of the Statute of
Westminster II was used, see Vol. 2, R. S. Mo. 1825, p. 631.
18. Law of Mo. 1911, p. 139.
19. Statutory Rules and Orders, Rev. vol. 7.
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of error, the only common law method of obtaining appellate
review, were likewise abolished in England in 1873. This is an-
other even more ancient relic, still authorized by the laws of
Missouri, which has now little but historical reasons for con-
tinued existence. Nevertheless, our status continue to carry an
elaborate code of rules for the use of writs of error.20 Surely a
party should be able to decide whether he desires to appeal, with-
in a month after final judgment is rendered, but, under our prac-
tice (because of the right to commence further proceedings by
writ of error), actual finality of all judgments is delayed for a
year, even though no appeal is ever taken.
The vitality of old methods to continue existence, and their
resistance to change by legislation is remarkable. Procedural
rules come to be looked upon as vested rights for purposes of
delay and strategy, instead of means for facilitating the dispatch
of business. The personnel of a legislature changes with every
session; time is short and there are many problems before them
which seem to require more immediate consideration; so it is not
difficult to postpone action on such matters as procedure. We
should, therefore, be able to understand to some extent why the
struggle for law reform, in England, began earlier and took
longer than it did in this country. No doubt because England
became a great commercial and industrial nation before we did,
the inconvenience of delay due to inadequate procedure was
noticed sooner, but forces in opposition were well organized and
had been long entrenched.2 1 We started with a new system of
courts in a new country and they were not immediately con-
gested.
Our own state was the second in America to adopt a legislative
code of procedure. Some idea of the inconvenience and delay re-
sulting from the adherence to common law forms of actions, both
in England and America, may be gained from a statement made
in 1848 by Judge R. W. Wells in his successful effort to urge the
Missouri Legislature to adopt the New York code. It was, as
follows:
"The old system of actions at law abounds in contradic-
tions and absurdities. Thus you have a promissory note; it
20. R. S. Mo. 1929, sees. 1034-1053.
21. See Sunderland, English Struggle for Law Reform (1926) 39 Harv.
Law Rev. 725.
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has something like a scroll, by way of seal. You sue in
assumpsit, and allege what is always required to be alleged
in assumpsit, that the defendant promised to pay you the
amount of the note. Now every word of your declaration
may be true and present an undeniable cause of action; yet
the court will tell you this flourish near the signature is a
scroll by way of seal. You cannot sue in assumpsit; it must
be debt. You should not have said that the defendant
promised to pay you, which to be sure is the exact truth, but
that he was indebted to you. * * * Let me amend my declara-
tions and put it right. 0 no! the system will not permit it;
you must go out of court, pay all the costs and begin anew.
In many actions, if you tell nothing but the truth, you can-
not recover, although you have an undoubted cause of action.
You must tell a falsehood or your declaration will be bad!
Thus, in assumpsit, you must state a promise to pay, al-
though there was none: In Trover, that you lost the prop-
erty, and it came to the possession of the defendant by
finding, none of which is true. In trespass, that the injury
was committed with force and arms; although there was
nothing of the kind used. In these cases, the truth would
not answer at all. * * * Then come the distinctions between
law and equity. If you mistake here, either as plaintiff or
defendant, nothing can save you. If you are sued at law, and
have an equitable defence, you must let judgment go against
you and pay all the costs, and then bring a suit in Chancery.
* * * Almost every suit of any importance has to go through
both law and equity. ' '22
Whatever may be said about our code it is far better than the
common law system. Perhaps the earliest legislative attempts
to allow the merits to prevail over the technicalities of common
law procedure were the Statutes of Jeofails. By one of the first
of such statutes (18 Eliz.), the want of an original writ was
aided after verdict. By 21 Jac. I, a reversal was not required
for variance in form only between original writ and declara-
tion.2 3 Early in the nineteenth century, the efforts of Bentham,
Brougham, Dickens and many others gradually produced results
in England. The pressure for improvement came from the public
rather than from the bar.2 3 ' The first attempt brought about the
Hillary Rules of 1834 providing for simplification of pleading.
22. Wells, Law Refornis, Pleadings and Practice, 90-91.
23. For a History of these and later statutes see 2 Tidd's Practice 823;
as to recognition of right to amend see 1 Tidd's, Practice 697.
23a. Supra, note 21.
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These rules were made by the judges of the Superior Courts and
laid before Parliament, but, after receiving its sanction, they
were considered statutory.24 Further progress was made by the
common law procedure acts of 1852 and 1860.25 But a real
remedy was not found until the Judicature Act of 1873 consoli-
dated Chancery, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, Ad-
miralty, Probate, Divorce, Bankruptcy and other courts into the
Supreme Court of Judicature with both trial and appellate divi-
sions. This act also adopted a code of procedure which like our
American codes abolished forms of actions and the distinctions
between actions at law and suits in equity. But this code of pro-
cedure instead of regulating every detail of procedure left much
to be filled in by court rules. More important still, it provided
that the rules of practice enacted could be "annulled or altered"
by the new court. Limitations on making rules by the court were
that "any rule made in the exercise of this power, whether for
altering or annulling any then existing rule, or for any other
purpose shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament"; that
either House by majority vote within 40 days could have any rule
annulled; and that no rule should change the mode of oral ex-
amination of witnesses, rules of evidence or the laws concerning
juries.26 The court was likewise authorized to make rules for
"practice and procedure in all criminal causes.1127
In 1875 the Judicature Act was amended and a new and much
more comprehensive code of procedural rules, with model forms
for pleadings, was adopted. It was, however, clearly stated that
these rules and all others whether made before or after the act
might "be annulled or altered" by the court, but concurrences of
the Lord Chancellor, Chief Justice, other designated presiding
judges of divisions, and Justices of Appeal were required rather
than only a majority of the judges, as provided by the 1873 Act.
It was evidently soon found that it was not satisfactory to place
the function of rule making entirely upon judges. Rules are now
made by a Rules Committee composed of the Lord Chancellor,
Chief Justice, Master of the Rolls, President of the Probate Divi-
sion (which also has jurisdiction of Divorce and Admiralty)
24. 1 Tidd's, Practice 675, note 1.
25. 2 Blackstone (Cooley's ed. 1872) 1194-5 note.
26. Sees. 68-74 Judicature Act.
27. See. 71, Judicature Act.
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four other judges of the Supreme Court, two practicing bar-
risters who are members of the Bar Council, and two practicing
solicitors. The last eight are appointed by the Lord Chancellor,
who with four other members may make rules. Rules must still
be laid before Parliament and may be annulled as provided in the
original act.2 S It is said that no rule has ever been so annulled.
The first complete code promulgated as Rules of Court was
completed in 1883. They have been amended and added to by
subsequent sets of rules, but many of them are still in force as
then written. The Consolidation Act of 1925 (15 and 16 Geo. V)
brought all legislation since 1873 into one act with such changes
as were deemed necessary. The Criminal Justice Act of 192529
provided similar improvements in the organization and functions
of the criminal courts. It is significant that not only was the rule
making power, both for civil and criminal cases, continued in the
Rules Committee, as above composed, but provision was also
made for a council of judges to meet and report annually "on
what amendments and additions they think expedient for the
better administration of justice." This council is charged "to
consider the operation of the Supreme Court of Judicature Con-
solidation Act, 1925, and the rules of court and the working of
the offices of the Supreme Court, and to inquire into any defects
which may appear to exist in the procedure of or administration
of law in the High Court or the Court of Appeal, or in any in-
ferior court.' ' 3" Thus England not only has provided means for
promptly making needed changes in procedure but has now re-
quired also regular and frequent investigation to determine such
need. Who should be better qualified to perform these functions
than lawyers and judges who work by these rules all the time?
It must not be assumed that the method of regulating practice
by rules of court was immediately satisfactory to everyone in
England, or that all evils were cured at once. It takes time and
lessons from experience to make any system work well. The rea-
son that this method will work well is not that courts make no
mistakes in regulating procedure by rules but that they have the
means of knowing when they have done so, by daily contact with
28. Supreme Court of Judicature Consolidation Act of 1925 (15 & 16 Geo.
V); 8 Halsbury's, Laws of England (2nd ed. 1933) 595.
29. 15 & 16 Geo. V. c. 86.
30. 8 Halsbury's, Laws of England (2nd ed. 1933) 594.
1937]
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the working of the rules, and they have the power to correct mis-
takes, as soon as they are observed, by changing rules. After the
new system was established, many felt as did one English lawyer,
who said: "The only thing I ever knew was special pleading, and
the moment I had learned that, the law reformers went and
abolished it." 1" In an English work on evidence in 1884, Taylor,
a former English Judge, said: "The fusion of law and equity,
which was to overthrow such a phalanx of abuses, and to frus-
trate so many knavish tricks, has resulted not only in confusion,
but, to use the vigorous language of our blind bard, in 'confusion
worse confounded'.132 Cooley even quotes Sir Frederick Pollock,
the great English law writer, as saying in the early nineties "that
for several years (after fusion of law and equity) the latter state
of the suitor was worse than the former"; and that "repeated
revision of the rules of court and some fresh legislation" was
needed before the reconstructed machine would work smoothly.""2
The thing that should not be overlooked is that when these con-
ditions developed there was the means at hand to do something
about it, and it was done.
How well this was done can be better judged now, after sixty
years' trial, than was possible in the nineties when it had been
in operation for only one-third of that time. Certainly it can now
be said that much has been done to eliminate delay and to save
judicial time, from construction of procedural technicalities, for
the consideration of the merits of cases. It is not possible, with-
out making this discussion too long, to go into the details of the
code now in operation there, but the following outstanding fea-
tures, which show how this is done, might well be mentioned.
First: Trial judges are not required to waste court time for
attacks on pleadings, default judgments, or for proof of formal
matters, and other details that tend to delay and prolong trials.
This is accomplished by proceedings before masters who dispose
of cases in which no trial is necessary and narrow the issues to
be heard in cases which must go to trial. Some of the methods
employed are:
31. Practice and Procedure (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Rev. 13, 17.
32. 2 Blackstone (Cooley's ed. 1872) 1196 n.
33. For a failure of judges to agree upon what some of the early rules
meant, which was at first not unusual, see Haunay v. Smwithwaite, 69 L. T.
N. S. 677 (1893).
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(a) Simplification of Pleadings. While pleadings must state
sufficient ultimate facts to make a case, or a defense, simple
forms are provided to eliminate unnecessary details, and prolix-
ity or other violation of the rules may be penalized by assess-
ment of costs. General denials are not permitted and a party
"must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he
does not admit the truth."'  Demurrers are not allowed, but a
case may, by leave, be set down for trial on the pleadings.35
These rules of pleading are very effective in eliminating dilatory
pleas or concealment of real issues, and tend to materially reduce
the disputed issues to be tried. Rules authorizing imposition of
costs upon a party who either asserts or denies a fact without
any reasonable basis therefor, go far to prevent smoke screens
of false issues for strategic purposes.
(b) Disclosure and Discovery. Orders specifying the disclos-
ures required are made by a master, after a conference with
counsel on what is known as Summons for Directions. These
include admission of facts, formally in issue, but not actually dis-
puted (unreasonable refusal to admit them will be penalized by
assessment of costs of proof) ; production of documents for in-
spection; information as to documents not in the possession of
the parties; and examination of witnesses as to material facts
(similar to our Missouri deposition practice) .36 As to the results
of these preliminary preparations for trial, Professor Sunder-
land of Michigan University, after a study of English procedure,
said: "With the facts on each side mutually understood by both
parties when the trial opens, leading questions no longer become
objectionable on many features of the case and the witness is
brought at once to the point in controversy * * * the necessity
for cross examination is greatly reduced, * * * formal admis-
sions of facts, and answers to interrogatories, eliminate many
features of the case which with us would call for extensive proof,
* * * there is no occasion for that elaborate maneuvering for
advantage, that vigilant and tireless eagerness to insist on every
objection, * * * which not only prolongs and complicates the
34. Higgins, English Courts and Procedure (1923) 7 Amer. Judicature
Soc. Journal 185 at 209-217.
35. Practice and Procedure (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Rev. 13, 17.
36. 23 Halsbury's, Laws of England (1st ed. 1912) 143, 145; 7 Amer.
Judicature Soc. Journal 217-220 (1923).
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trial, but helps to make the outcome of an American lawsuit
turn as much upon the skill of counsel as upon the merits of the
case."
3 7
(c) Summons for Directions. An ordinary action in King's
Bench or Chancery is commenced by writ of summons, prepared
by plaintiff's solicitor, sealed by the proper officer, and indorsed
with a statement of the nature of the claim made or relief
sought 8 After service or acceptance, defendant makes appear-
ance, which may be conditional or unconditional, usually within
eight days although more time may be given.3 At one time a
Summons for Directions could be had before pleadings, but since
1932 plaintiff usually delivers his statement either with the writ
or within ten days after appearance thereto, and defendant de-
livers his defense within fourteen days after appearance or re-
ceipt of plaintiff's statement. Plaintiff may within seven days
thereafter deliver a reply.40 The Summons for Directions is usu-
ally the next step, and by it the parties are notified to appear
before a master who may then make orders in the case concern-
ing the following matters: Pleadings, particulars, admissions,
discovery, interrogatories, inspection of documents, inspection of
real or personal property, commissions, examination of wit-
nesses, place and mode of trial, and any other interlocutory mat-
ter.41 The parties informally come before the Master, talk over
the nature of the case and the procedural steps they think neces-
sary to bring it to an issue. He makes the required orders. How
much time in court can be thus saved is apparent.
Second: Great benefits accrue to the commercial community,
as well as a saving of judicial time, from having machinery for
prompt collection of debts in cases where the claim is not actually
controverted. The means is provided for getting an immediate
judgment on such a claim without delay or expense. When there
is no appearance this is done by allowing default judgment to be
entered by a master. If defendant does appear, plaintiff may file
affidavit stating the facts of his claim and his belief that there is
37. Sunderland, An Appraisal of the English Procedure (1925) 50 A. B.
A. Reports 242, 248.
38. 23 Halsbury's, Laws of England (1st ed. 1912) 109-110.
39. 23 Halsbury's, Laws of England (1st ed. 1912) 124.
40. Supra, note 31, at p. 18-19.
41. 23 Halsbury's, Laws of England (1st ed. 1912) 106; 7 Amer. Judica-
ture Soc. Journal 204 (1923).
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no defense. He may then have summary judgment unless de-
fendant can make affidavit showing a fair probability of a real
defense. Generalities, conclusions and sham defenses for delay
are of no avail. However, if a master refuses leave to defend,
defendant is protected by the right to appeal to a judge in Cham-
bers. If the judge grants leave, plaintiff cannot appeal and the
case proceeds for trial, but if he refuses it, defendant can still
appeal to the Court of Appeals. Those appeals are immediately
decided.42 This speedily disposes of a great number of cases
seeking only to put in operation the legal machinery for collect-
ing debts.
Third: A remedy is provided for immediately determining
rights dependent upon the construction of deeds, wills, contracts,
and statutes by Declaratory Judgments settling the rights of
parties before they have acted thereunder and before any damage
has been sustained from such action. Concerning this practice,
Professor Sunderland has said: "The service rendered by the
courts under the declaratory judgment practice is quite ana-
lagous to that rendered by modern hospitals which diagnose and
treat diseases in their incipient stages and thereby prevent the
development of more dangerous conditions. So useful and effec-
tive has this practice become in England that several judges of
the High Court are frequently engaged simultaneously in making
declarations of rights, and the size of the dockets which they dis-
pose of is eloquent testimony of the speed with which the work
can be done.42 Since our last Legislature adopted a Declaratory
Judgments Act4" precedents and procedure therefore under the
English practice should now be of particular interest to Mis-
souri lawyers.
Fourth: The conduct of a trial is under the control of a judge,
who has life tenure, and who, although chosen by the leaders of
his political party in control of Parliament, is selected only if he
has really demonstrated legal ability. Englishmen believe the
judge's control is impartially exercised for the purpose of finding
42. 23 Halsbury's, Laws of England (1st ed. 1912) 134: Sunderland,
supra, note 37, at 244; 7 Amer. Judicature Soc. Journal 223; 51 Law Quar-
terly Rev. 15 (1935).
43. Supra, note 37, at p. 246.
44. Laws of Mo. 1935, p. 218. See for discussion Note, Declaratory Judg-
ments with Recent Missouri Developments (1935) 21 ST. Louis LAw REVIEW
49.
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the truth of the controversy so that the merits may prevail. This
belief is shown by the fact that most civil cases there are now
tried before the court without a jury.45
Fifth: The rules of procedute are flexible. They not only can
be changed by the method authorized by Parliament, but they
are meant to be applied according to the circumstances of the
case. Discretionary powers are granted to the judges throughout
the rules to give special leave for additional time and to allow
amendments; and it is provided that "non-compliance ** :1 with
any rule of practice * * * shall not render any proceedings void
unless the court or judge shall so direct, but such proceedings
may be set aside either wholly or in part as irregular, or
amended, or otherwise dealt with in such manner and upon such
terms as the court or judge shall think fit."46 Violation of pro-
cedural rules does not prevent a consideration on the merits but
may bring assessment of costs as a penalty. Costs do not follow
the result of the case, but are awarded as the court deems to be
proper.
Sixth: Appeals are promptly heard and decided. New trials
are few and can be granted only by the court of appeal and they
may be limited to specific issues instead of a retrial of the whole
case. Writs of error, bills of exceptions, and assignments of
error have been abolished. Written or printed briefs are not re-
quired and appeals are heard, on copies of the records of the trial
divisions, upon oral argument and the decision is usually an-
nounced then and there. The trial and appellate divisions are
part of the same court and sit in the same court house, except
where cases are heard in assizes or county courts, but since there
is no local venue of actions, most important civil cases are tried
in London. Order 5847 provides that all appeals "shall be by way
of rehearing" on "the whole or any part of any judgment or
order * * * whether final or interlocutory"; that the appellate
court has "discretionary power to receive further evidence upon
questions of fact"; ("without special leave upon interlocutory
applications" but "upon appeals from a judgment after trial
* * * on special grounds only and not without special leave") ;
that the court of appeal shall have power to draw inference of
45. See sees. 99-101 Consolidated Act of 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. V.
46. Order 70, 7 Statutory Rules and Orders Rev. 179.
47. 7 Statutory Rules and Orders Rev. 142.
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fact and to give any judgment 'and to make any order which
ought to have been made"; and that "such powers may also be
exercised in favor of all or any of the respondents or parties
although such respondents or parties may not have appealed."
The court of appeal, therefore, has supervisory power over the
trial divisions at all stages of the case and this provides safe-
guards against arbitrary or erroneous action before rights are
prejudiced thereby. Furthermore, the purpose of appellate re-
view after judgment is to afford a full rehearing on the merits
and end the case. A complete new trial of a case once tried is
very unusual. Of course a system of appeals from all interlocu-
tory orders grafted onto our present system would result here
in endless delay. It does not do so under the English system
because such appeals are quickly decided on summary hearing
and because unreasonable appeals are penalized by assessment of
costs. The English bar has been educated not to attempt to gain
advantage by mere delay.
An idea of the kind of procedural system, that the English
method may ultimately make possible, can be gained from a
statement, which the writer heard made by Lord Wright, Master
of the Rolls (as such he is presiding judge of the Chancery Di-
vision of the Supreme Court of England, and a member of the
Rules Committee), at the Harvard University Law School's re-
cent conference on the Future of the Common Law. He said, in
substance, that it was now hoped that the rules could soon be
further simplified and rewritten; that the courts could then stop
taking any space in opinions to discuss the construction and ap-
plication of procedural rules; and that they would work smoothly
enough so that it would only be necessary for members of the
bar to become familiar with how the court applied them, through
experience in their practice. Thus procedural rules would truly
become working tools of lawyers to bring controversies to prompt
decision on the merits, rather than (as some of ours have be-
come) obstacles to overcome before they can get their cases de-
cided. It seems to an American lawyer that much progress has
already been made toward this goal. A comparison of points of
law decided in recent English cases, with those ruled in cases
in any jurisdiction in this country, very strikingly shows that
procedure is now rarely discussed in English decisions, but that
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our books are filled with rulings upon how our statutory pro-
cedural rules are to be construed and applied.
II
The writer does not hold the opinion that the English system
is perfect, or that everything which works well there would
necessarily do as well here. Nevertheless, a system of procedure
which does work well in a great commercial and industrial na-
tion, where the fundamental principles of our laws and institu-
tions were developed, is worthy of our examination and study,
especially in view of increasing dissatisfaction with our own.
We may justly say that England did not have satisfactory pro-
cedure for modern times until she came to us for the idea of
abolishing common law forms of action and removing the dis-
tinctions between law and equity. We may now well consider
whether the method adopted there, of procedural rules made by
courts (or councils or committees under their guidance and con-
trol), will better enable our system of code pleading to be brought
up to date and to continue in the future to keep pace with the
times, so that it will function efficiently in the increasingly intri-
cate and changing conditions, created in business and industryj
by modern science and invention. The English people, during
the last six centuries, have perhaps endured about as much bad
government as any other people, but they have to their credit
much worthwhile accomplishment, in modern good government,
due to ability to learn from their experience, and we could profit
by it too. A recent English review of their own system points
out these results: "That of every hundred actions commenced
by a writ in the Supreme Court only one comes to trial"; that
"the other ninety-nine" by means of the interlocutory adminis-
tration of details by masters "undergo a process of elimination";
and that this method usually disposes of cases without a trial in
one of the following ways: "The defendant * * * may pay out
on the writ"; the case may end because disclosure may reveal
that "defendent may have no defence" or "plaintiff no real case";
or "parties may come to terms" because "Master or Judge sug-
gests a via media which leads to the amicable settlement of the
action.148 To waste judicial time by dilatory tactics intended
48. Practice and Procedure (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Rev. 13, 23.
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only to delay action, in cases which could be thus disposed of, in
an economic loss to everybody.
It cannot be fairly denied that during the last quarter of a
century, many new problems arising from modern industrial and
urban conditions have been unable to get quick and efficient
treatment in our courts. Because of popular demand for a forum
for prompt settlement of these new questions, new administra-
tive tribunals have been created. It is indicative, of the popular
attitude toward the ability of lawyers and courts to dispatch
business promptly by the methods they have been using, that
members of these new tribunals are not usually required to be
learned in the law, and that they are allowed to determine their
own procedure. Laymen are authorized to decide questions of
law and determine facts without requiring that they be guided
by knowledge or instructions concerning the law. Usually their
determination of facts is made binding upon courts in whatever
judicial review is provided, so that there is no appeal from or
review of decisions of these laymen as to many ultimate facts,
in the determination of which the application of rules of sub-
stantive law are necessarily involved. Many relations of em-
ployer and employee, public utilities and their customers, rail-
roads and shippers, and rights and duties of other agencies of
transportation have been largely removed from the courts.
Measures are being proposed to also place in the hands of law
administrative bodies such matters as injuries caused by opera-
tion of motor vehicles, labor relations, insurance, and many other
problems of commerce, industry and agriculture. This develop-
ment has only begun. Where it will lead to we cannot know.
It is especially worthy of notice, that acts creating such ad-
ministrative tribunals usually emphasize the provisions that hear-
ings shall be simple and summary and that these bodies shall
have the power to make their own rules of practice and proce-
dure. In our Workmen's Compensation Commission Act,49 pro-
vides: "All proceedings before the Commission or any commis-
sioner shall be simple, informal and summary. * * * Except as
herein otherwise provided, all such proceedings shall be accord-
ing to such rules and regulations as may be adopted by the Com-
mission." In our Public Service Commission Act,50 provides:
49. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 3349.
50. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5144.
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"All hearings before the Commission shall be governed by rules
to be adopted and prescribed by the Commission." Similar ex-
amples will be found in other states and in Federal legislation.
Why do not legislatures, in creating administrative tribunals,
provide them with a complete statutory code of practice and
procedure? Undoubtedly it is because they do not want to ham-
string and delay their action, impair their efficiency, and limit
their ability to promptly determine the merits of questions en-
trusted to them for solution. Why then are the courts kept in
strait-jackets of strict statutory procedural codes which pro-
vide so many means for delaying and evading a determination
of the merits of cases? Surely lawyers and judges are not less
capable than laymen of making rules of procedure, which will
make possible prompt determination of cases on the merits. At
least they have shown, in England, that they can do so when
given the opportunity and responsibility.
Let it be recognized that the adoption of our statutory codes
marked a tremendous advance, although they carried over and
continued many ancient common law practices. Their great de-
fect was that, in failing to provide adequate means for improve-
ment, they froze the rules of practice and thereby lost the op-
portunity to continue that advance so well begun. Procedural
codes made for conditions of the times of circuit riders of the
eighteen forties could not be expected to function, in all respects,
for prompt and efficient dispatch of business under modern urban
industrial conditions. Rules of substantive law, which establish
fundamental rights and determine the principles upon which
they are based, determine what rights an individual shall have.
They should not be changed without most careful and extended
deliberation and then only when such a change is a vital neces-
sity to prevent future injustice to others. Rules of procedure
only determine how and when a dispute about such rights shall
be brought to an issue. Whenever a rule operates to prevent
bringing such a dispute promptly to an issue it ought to be abol-
ished. Whenever a rule can be improved to bring the disputed
question to definite issues in a clearer way within a more reason-
able time it ought to be amended. It is often a complete denial
of the benefit of a substantial right to unduly delay a decision
concerning it, because changed conditions may make the right
valueless before it can be established.
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New means of communication and transportation have speeded
up all business, and new procedural methods are required to
promptly transact the great volume of judicial business arising
from these new relations and new conditions of today. There
would be more legal business for lawyers to transact if this could
be done, because unquestionably the surest way for lawyers to
have more business is for courts and lawyers to handle business
that comes to them promptly and efficiently. People will not
tolerate forever any system which delays unreasonably the deter-
mination of questions they seek to have decided. If courts do
not function without vexatious delay, they will find means to
have them decided outside of the courts. Surely, lawyers ought
to see that what is in the public interest is in their own interest.
Surely, if this matter is given intelligent consideration, both
lawyers and laymen would see, from its results in England and
its adoption in our federal courts, that regulation of practice and
procedure by rules of court is worth a trial in our state courts.
Of course the details of a system fitted to our needs would differ
from those of England where ten times the population of this
state live in an area little more than half its size. If both lawyers
and laymen desire that it be tried, it will not be difficult to devise
either the means of putting it into operation or the broad out-
lines to be followed in its development. Will our bar lead such a
movement for improvement, or will it overlook this great oppor-
tunity for leadership toward worthwhile accomplishment to ful-
fill a pressing public need?
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